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While the dollar’s 
supremacy isn’t likely to 
fade soon, a substantial 
allocation of SDRs in 
2009 brought them back 
into the spotlight.
T
he financial crisis that began in mid-2007 brought renewed calls 
for an alternative to the U.S. dollar as the dominant reserve cur-
rency in international transactions. Several developing countries suggested 
greater use of special drawing rights (SDRs).1
SDRs  were  created  in  1969  under  the  first  amendment  of  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement to supplement 
member countries’ international reserves.2 Nine years later, the IMF set the 
long-term objective of making the SDR “the principal reserve asset in the 
international monetary system.”3 To date, the SDR hasn’t fulfilled that lofty 
aspiration. While the dollar’s supremacy isn’t likely to fade soon, a sub-
stantial allocation of SDRs in 2009 brought them back into the spotlight.
A Brief History of SDRs
Special drawing rights were designed to support the Bretton Woods 
international monetary system. Under this system, the U.S. pegged the 
value of the dollar to the price of gold, while other countries pegged 
their currencies to the dollar. To maintain the peg, countries needed to 
hold reserves—gold or U.S. dollars—to purchase their domestic currencies 
in foreign exchange markets. Although advanced economies performed 
well under Bretton Woods, it was short lived.4 The system required the 
U.S. to achieve two mutually inconsistent objectives: maintain balance-of-
payments deficits to satisfy growing world demand for dollars while pre-
serving the currency’s fixed exchange rate to gold. Persistent U.S. deficits 
in international transactions during the late 1950s boosted concerns about 
a dollar–gold convertibility crisis as dollar liabilities rose relative to U.S. 
gold holdings.
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Table 1 
SDR Allocations and Holdings, by Participant
(1981 to 2008, percent of total SDR stock)










Other advanced economies 15.7 12.5
Developing economies
Africa 6.5 1.3
Developing Asia 9.1 4.2
Of which: China 1.1 2.4
  India 3.2 0.5
Western Hemisphere 9.6 5.0
Of which: Argentina 1.5 1.4
  Brazil 1.7 0.1
Middle East 4.1 5.8
Economies in transition 1.2 1.0
IMF and other holders of SDRs 13.7
NOTES: Country aggregates are based on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook classifica-
tion. The outstanding stock of SDRs and the allocations to specific countries were unchanged between 1981 and 2008. 
Countries whose average holdings over this period exceed their allocations are net creditors into the SDR system.
SOURCE: IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
Some recommended creating a 
new source of liquidity. This was a 
difficult task. Years of negotiations 
culminated in the creation of the first 
amendment to the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement. During drafting of the 
document, great effort was spent on 
terminology acceptable to all negotiat-
ing countries. Terms such as reserve 
assets, reserve drawing rights or spe-
cial reserve drawing rights—although 
used in early versions of the draft—
were avoided amid heated disputes 
over whether the new instrument 
would be a reserve asset. The term 
ultimately agreed upon—special draw-
ing rights—was in some ways ambigu-
ous in order to reconcile opposing 
views.5
Since the IMF’s early years, 
“drawings” or “drawing rights” have 
been informal expressions commonly 
used to refer to currency a member 
country could purchase from the IMF 
to meet balance-of-payments needs.  
As a result, it was necessary to add 
the word “special” to special drawing 
rights to indicate their novelty and dis-
tinguish the term from the old mean-
ing of drawing rights.6 Significantly, 
SDRs are not an IMF liability, but 
rather a potential claim on widely 
used currencies such as the U.S. dol-
lar, Japanese yen, euro and pound 
sterling. 
By the time special drawing rights 
debuted, disputes that had shaped the 
name abated and SDRs were recog-
nized as reserve assets.7 Later, the IMF 
decided to make the acronym SDR an 
official term.8 
What’s ‘Special’ About SDRs
After the Bretton Woods system 
collapsed in 1971, major countries 
shifted to floating exchange rates, and 
the need for SDRs diminished. Today, 
there are 204 billion SDRs in circula-
tion, all created through a few alloca-
tions. General allocations of SDRs, 
based on long-term global needs to 
supplement reserves, occurred in 
1970–72, 1979–1981 and August 2009. 
The special allocation in September 
2009 distributed SDRs to countries that 
joined the IMF after 1981.
SDRs in the post-Bretton Woods 
era fulfill some of the functions of 
money—for example,  they serve as 
a unit of account and a store of val-
ue—but have only a limited role as a 
medium of exchange. Therefore, SDRs 
aren’t money. They can be used only 
in specific transactions involving other 
holders of SDRs. If a country wishes 
to use some of its SDRs, it finds 
another participant in the SDR system 
to receive them and provide currency 
in exchange.9 In this way, SDRs give 
a country the ability to obtain major 
currencies.
SDRs serve as a unit of account 
for the IMF and other international 
organizations. Originally, the value of 
a special drawing right was 0.888671 
grams of fine gold, which then 
equaled $1. In 1971, when the dollar 
was devalued, the SDR maintained 
its nominal gold value and became 
known as “paper gold.”10 Later, as the 
importance of gold in the international 
monetary system diminished, the 
value of the SDR was determined by 
reference to a basket of IMF member-
country currencies. The basket—cur-
rently composed of the U.S. dollar, the 
Japanese yen, the euro and the pound 
sterling—may be expanded later this 
year when a five-year review of SDR 
valuation occurs.11 
As a store of value, SDRs are 
equivalent to foreign exchange reserves. 
An allocation of SDRs gives each coun-
try access to an unconditional line of 
credit. When a country draws on its line 
of credit, exchanging SDRs for currency, 	 EconomicLetter	 Federal reserVe baNk oF dallas 	 Federal reserVe baNk oF dallas  EconomicLetter 3
Chart 1


















Third general and ﬁrst
special SDR allocations
NOTE: The measure of world reserves used is total reserves minus gold.
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.
it pays interest. The SDR interest rate 
is computed as a weighted average 
of interest rates on three-month gov-
ernment debt of the countries whose 
currencies are in the SDR basket. This 
calculation is a bit arbitrary because the 
SDR itself has no maturity. Moreover, 
the interest rate obtained may be 
below the rate that would be deter-
mined in an open market for SDRs (if 
such a market existed) because they 
are generally viewed as less liquid than 
government instruments. Nonetheless, 
SDR allocations are especially ben-
eficial for countries that can’t readily 
access international capital markets or 
for which access is expensive.
Role in Global Monetary System
By some metrics, the SDR’s impor-
tance has grown over time. Its accep-
tance as a reserve asset has increased 
since the early 1980s, when advanced 
countries raised SDR holdings above 
their allocations, allowing develop-
ing countries to obtain currency with 
ease. While initially, countries were 
compelled to hold a minimum level of 
SDRs, the requirement ended in 1981.12 
Since then, developing economies such 
as Brazil and India have used most of 
their SDR allocations as a source of 
credit for extended periods (Table 1).
Still, the SDR hasn’t achieved the 
dominance its creators envisioned. 
The IMF’s attempts to broaden market 
use of the SDR during the 1980s—by 
promoting it as a financial asset and 
allowing other institutions, such as 
development banks, to hold SDRs—
didn’t meet with much success. There 
was little demand to use the SDR in 
more sophisticated transactions, such 
as currency swaps or forwards, or as 
collateral for loans. As an international 
reserve asset, the SDR has also played 
a limited role. Each new allocation 
brought a temporary surge in the share 
of world reserves denominated in 
SDRs. Nonetheless, due to limited allo-
cations and growth in world reserves, 
SDRs accounted for less than 1 percent 
of world reserves by the mid-2000s 
(Chart 1). 
Reasons for the SDR’s limited role 
include poor liquidity, lack of market 
pricing and the relatively small amount 
outstanding. But perhaps most signifi-
cant is that once worries regarding a 
U.S. dollar crisis fade, SDRs simply fall 
out of fashion.
It isn’t surprising that proposals for 
an SDR-based international monetary 
system were dusted off during the 
recent crisis as countries with large U.S. 
dollar reserves—seeing the U.S. mon-
etary base expand—feared the value of 
their holdings would be undermined. 
Talk of an orderly diversification of 
reserve assets from dollars to SDRs res-
urrected the IMF’s plans to establish a 
substitution account. Such an account 
would enable central banks to swap 
excess reserves for SDRs but would 
leave the IMF with a mismatch between 
U.S. dollar-denominated assets and 
SDR-denominated liabilities. Efforts to 
create this reserve-diversification account 
failed—first in 1974 and again in 1980—
because there was no agreement on 
how to apportion exchange-rate risk.
Today, increasing the SDR’s 
popularity would require more regular 
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allocations and agreement on the same 
difficult issues that stalemated previ-
ous negotiations. It remains to be seen 
whether recent SDR allocations were a 
short-term response to the global crisis 
or the first of many steps in monetary 
system reform.
Cociuba is a research economist in the 
Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute  
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
Notes
1 See “Reform the International Monetary 
System,” speech by Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of 
People’s Bank of China, March 23, 2009. Brazil, 
Russia and India supported China’s call. 
2 International reserves are assets denominated 
in a foreign currency held by a country’s central 
bank. These reserves can be used to finance 
international transactions.
3 See Article VIII, Section 7, and Article XXII of 
the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agree-
ment of the International Monetary Fund, effective 
April 1, 1978.
4 For a detailed discussion of the Bretton Woods 
system, see, for example, “Monetary Policy 
Regimes and Economic Performance: The His-
torical Record,” by Michael D. Bordo and Anna J. 
Schwartz, in Handbook of Macroeconomics, John 
B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, ed., Amsterdam: 
Elsevier, 1999, pp. 149–234.
5 For discussions of the choice of language in 
negotiations that led to the creation of SDRs, see 
“Special Drawing Rights: The Role of Language,” 
by Joseph Gold, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Pamphlet Series, no. 15, 1971, and “The 
International Monetary Fund: 1966-1971: The 
System Under Stress,” by Margaret Garritsen de 
Vries, IMF, 1976.
6 For more details, see note 5, Gold.
7 At the annual meeting of the IMF’s board of 
governors in 1969, the managing director spoke 
of “deliberate creation of reserves by the interna-
tional community,” and the governor for France 
referred to SDRs as a “new reserve asset of an 
unconditional type, designed to supplement gold 
and foreign exchange in the holdings of central 
banks” (see IMF’s Summary Proceedings, 1969, 
p. 9 and p. 58).
8 See Rule B-6 of the IMF’s Rules and Regula-
tions, adopted in 1983.
9 Originally, the IMF designated a country with 
strong balance of payments and reserve position 
to be the receiver of SDRs and provide currency 
to a country in need. Later, several countries 
volunteered to buy and sell SDRs as necessary, 
eliminating the need for designation.
10 See “Silent Revolution: International Monetary 
Fund, 1979-1989,” by James M. Boughton, Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 2001, pp. 924–62.
11 The basket originally consisted of 16 currencies 
but was reduced to the currencies of the five 
countries with the largest exports of goods and 
services over the previous five years. The basket 
included the U.S. dollar, Japanese yen, Deutsche 
mark, French franc and pound sterling. In 1999, 
the mark and the franc were replaced by the euro.
12 Countries in the SDR system were initially 
required to partially reconstitute their holdings of 
SDRs. Before 1979, average holdings of SDRs 
over a period of five years had to be at least 30 
percent of the allocated amount. This floor was 
brought down to 15 percent in 1979 and to zero 
in 1981. 